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PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION:
PROTECTING LGBT STUDENTS
FROM SCHOOL VOUCHER DISCRIMINATION
Adam Mengler*
More than a dozen states operate school voucher programs, which allow
parents to apply state tax dollars to their children’s private school tuition.
Many schools that participate in voucher programs are affiliated with
religions that disapprove of homosexuality. As such, voucher-accepting
schools across the country have admissions policies that discriminate
against LGBT students and students with LGBT parents. Little recourse
exists for students who suffer discrimination at the hands of voucheraccepting schools.
This Note considers two ways to provide protection from such
discrimination for LGBT students and ultimately argues that the best route
is for an LGBT student to bring a lawsuit under the Equal Protection Clause.
Such a lawsuit would require a finding of “state action,” which U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence suggests would present a serious challenge for a
plaintiff. This Note suggests that plaintiffs should urge courts to take a more
relaxed approach to state action due to the unique nature of the
discrimination at issue.
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INTRODUCTION
If you live in Indiana, your state government uses your tax dollars to
discriminate against vulnerable LGBT1 youth through its school voucher
program.2 Indiana has the largest statewide school voucher program in the
1. In recent years, discussions of sexual orientation and gender identity have begun to
employ more inclusive acronyms, such as LGBTQ. See Michael Gold, The ABCs of
L.G.B.T.Q.I.A.+, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/21/style/
lgbtq-gender-language.html [https://perma.cc/QP2X-6N72]. For ease of reading, this Note
uses the most commonly recognized acronym, LGBT, as an umbrella term to encompass the
full spectrum of sexual and gender minorities affected by voucher discrimination.
2. School vouchers are state-funded educational scholarships that make public funding
available for students to attend private schools. See infra Part I.A (discussing the history and
mechanics of school voucher programs).
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country.3 Many of the private schools that participate in the voucher program
have discriminatory admissions policies. For example, the student handbook
for Blackhawk Christian School in Fort Wayne, Indiana, states that the school
reserves the right to reject or discontinue the enrollment of any student
“living in, condoning, or supporting sexual immorality; practicing
homosexual lifestyle or alternative gender identity, promoting such practices,
or otherwise having the inability to support the moral principles of the
school.”4 This policy allows the school to reject or expel any LGBT student
simply because of his or her sexual orientation.
The enrollment policy from Lighthouse Christian Academy in
Bloomington, Indiana, is perhaps even more alarming. In its enrollment
brochure, the school reserves the right to reject or discontinue the enrollment
of any students whose home includes “homosexual or bisexual activity” or
“practicing alternate gender identity or any other identity or behavior that
violates God’s ordained distinctions between the two sexes, male and
female.”5 Thus, students are not only vulnerable to discrimination as a result
of their own sexual orientation or gender identity—students can be, and have
been, excluded from private schools due to their parent’s sexual orientation
and gender identity.6 These admissions policies are not isolated cases of
discrimination. According to one study, approximately 10 percent of
voucher schools in Indiana—totaling at least twenty-seven schools—have
admissions policies “suggesting or declaring that LGBT students are not
welcome.”7 School voucher discrimination is not limited to Indiana; scores

3. Cory Turner & Anya Kamenetz, School Vouchers Get 2 New Report Cards, NPR
(June 26, 2017, 3:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/06/26/533192616/schoolvouchers-get-a-new-report-card [https://perma.cc/SX98-UP79]; Stephanie Wang, Indiana
Still Has the Nation’s Largest Voucher Program. But Growth Is Slowing Down., CHALKBEAT
(Mar. 1, 2018), https://in.chalkbeat.org/posts/in/2018/03/01/indiana-still-has-the-nationslargest-voucher-program-but-growth-is-slowing-down/ [https://perma.cc/TQ75-XK7L]. In
the fall of 2016, more than 34,000 Indiana students used vouchers to attend private schools.
Julia Donheiser, Choice for Most: In Nation’s Largest Voucher Program, $16 Million Went
to Schools with Anti-LGBT Policies, CHALKBEAT (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.chalkbeat.org/
posts/us/2017/08/10/choice-for-most-in-nations-largest-voucher-program-16-million-wentto-schools-with-anti-lgbt-policies/ [https://perma.cc/26N5-Q3LY].
4. BLACKHAWK CHRISTIAN SCH., PARENT-STUDENT HANDBOOK 2018–2019, at 23 (2018),
http://www.blackhawkchristian.org/downloads/Parent-Student-HandbookSECONDARY.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7LF-VWG5].
5. Brittani Howell, Lighthouse Christian Academy Responds to Concerns over Its
Admissions Policy, HERALD TIMES (May 26, 2017), http://www.heraldtimesonline.com/news/
local/lighthouse-christian-academy-responds-to-concerns-over-its-admissions-policy/article_
92d88110-415b-11e7-bfc0-87e27ca51d68.html [https://perma.cc/89SJ-HC4D].
6. This Note focuses on discrimination against children because of their own sexual
orientation rather than the sexual orientation of their parents. For a discussion of claims
specifically stemming from discrimination against a student because of his or her parents’
sexual orientation, see generally Daniel Makofsky, The New “Illegitimate Child”: How
Parochial Schools Are Imputing Discrimination Against Homosexuals to Children of
Homosexual Parents and Getting Away with It, 26 J.C.R. & ECON. DEV. 965 (2013).
7. Donheiser, supra note 3.
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of schools across the country that participate in state-run voucher programs
treat LGBT students as second-class citizens.8
LGBT youth already face high levels of discrimination in schools even
without overtly biased school admissions policies. The data regarding
general LGBT discrimination and its effect on mental health is harrowing.
According to a recent study by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, nearly one-third of lesbian, gay, and bisexual youth had
attempted suicide at least once in the last year, compared to 6 percent of
heterosexual youth.9 According to a 2012 Human Rights Campaign report,
nearly 20 percent of LGBT youth have experienced physical violence at
school.10 More than 50 percent of LGBT youth report being verbally
harassed and called names at school—more than twice the rate at which nonLGBT students experience such harassment.11 These and other struggles
faced by LGBT youth threaten their academic and career success.12 When
states allow voucher-accepting private schools to maintain discriminatory
policies and practices, the states are actively contributing to hostile
environments that are serious threats to the health and well-being of LGBT
youth.
The issue of discrimination in voucher-accepting private schools has
recently gained national attention due to the Trump administration’s
commitment to expanding federal support for school-choice programs,13
which include voucher programs.14 As originally proposed, President
Trump’s 2018 budget redirected nearly $1.5 billion to expand school-choice
operations,15 while eliminating or downsizing more than twenty other
8. See infra Part I.B (highlighting instances of voucher-accepting private schools with
discriminatory admissions policies).
9. Laura Kann et al., Sexual Identity, Sex of Sexual Contacts, and Health-Related
Behaviors Among Students in Grades 9–12—United States and Selected Sites 2015, 65
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REPORT, Aug. 12, 2016, at 1, 20, https://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/volumes/65/ss/ss6509a1.htm [https://perma.cc/M2JX-HCEW]. Note that transgender
youth were not included in this statistic.
10. HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, GROWING UP LGBT IN AMERICA: HRC YOUTH SURVEY
REPORT KEY FINDINGS 16 (2012), https://assets.hrc.org//files/assets/resources/Growing-UpLGBT-in-America_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ACP-44F6].
11. Id. at 7, 11.
12. See LGBT Youth, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/lgbthealth/youth.htm [http://perma.cc/
T28D-DFUJ] (last updated June 21, 2017).
13. “School choice” refers to the practice of providing educational options beyond
traditional public schooling. See infra Part I.A.
14. During his presidential campaign, then-candidate Trump said he would allocate $20
billion to create a federal block grant that would vastly expand the reach of the federal schoolchoice program. See Sean Sullivan & Emma Brown, Trump Pitches $20 Billion Education
Plan at Ohio Charter School That Received Poor Marks from State, WASH. POST (Sept. 8,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/09/08/trump-pitches20-billion-education-plan-at-ohio-charter-school-that-received-poor-marks-from-state/
[https://perma.cc/2RRR-J3MU].
15. Emma Brown, Valerie Strauss & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Trump’s First Full
Education Budget: Deep Cuts to Public School Programs in Pursuit of School Choice, WASH.
POST (May 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/trumps-first-fulleducation-budget-deep-cuts-to-public-school-programs-in-pursuit-of-school-choice/2017/
05/17/2a25a2cc-3a41-11e7-8854-21f359183e8c_story.html [https://perma.cc/2RSJ-WL5E].
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student-centered educational programs, including funding for the Special
Olympics.16 Although Congress rejected this part of the proposal,17 Trump
was undeterred. His 2019 budget proposal once again allocated over
$1 billion for school-choice expansion.18
The Trump administration’s selection of Betsy DeVos as Secretary of
Education further illuminated its affection for school-choice expansion, as
she is one of the nation’s foremost proponents of school choice.19 Secretary
DeVos inadvertently focused the school-choice discussion on discrimination
when she indicated that private schools receiving taxpayer dollars in the form
of vouchers may discriminate against LGBT students without reproach from
the Department of Education. During a May 2017 hearing before a
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee regarding President
Trump’s proposed budget, Secretary DeVos testified regarding how she
planned to implement her school-choice agenda.20 The subcommittee
specifically asked Secretary DeVos how she would handle a voucheraccepting private school that discriminates against LGBT students and
presented her with an example: the Lighthouse Christian Academy in

16. Erica L. Green, Betsy DeVos Refuses to Rule Out Giving Funds to Schools That
Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/24/us/
politics/betsy-devos-refuses-to-rule-out-giving-funds-to-schools-that-discriminate.html
[https://perma.cc/QP63-2RQ7].
17. On September 7, 2017, the Senate Committee on Appropriations approved an
appropriations bill that did not include allocations for the proposed school-choice expansion,
effectively shutting down the proposal for the 2018 fiscal year. See Mercedes Schneider,
Senate Appropriations Has No Funding for Betsy DeVos’ Private School Voucher Hopes,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 11, 2017), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/senateappropriations-has-no-funding-for-betsy-devos_us_59b5ebd4e4b0c50640cd68c8
[https://perma.cc/C6NP-FM92].
18. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EFFICIENT, EFFECTIVE, ACCOUNTABLE: AN AMERICAN
BUDGET 40 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/budgetfy2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4XG-GYPH]; J. Brian Charles, Trump Proposes
Unprecedented Expansion of School Choice, GOVERNING (Feb. 12, 2018),
http://www.governing.com/topics/education/gov-trump-doe-education-budget-schoolsstates.html [https://perma.cc/8VSU-7R29]. Congress again rejected these school-choice
proposals. See Moriah Balingit & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Congress Rejects Much of Betsy
DeVos’s
Agenda
in
Spending
Bill,
WASH. POST (Mar.
24,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/education/wp/2018/03/21/congress-rejects-much-ofbetsy-devoss-agenda-in-spending-bill/ [https://perma.cc/A2BF-E7TB]. Nonetheless, Trump
and Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos have shown no signs of conceding on the issue, so
it is still a viable consideration. See Emily Richmond, Does Trump’s Education Budget Even
Matter?, ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/02/
does-trumps-education-budget-even-matter/553271/ [https://perma.cc/FV9H-SGSW] (noting
that, despite the lack of congressional support, Trump and DeVos “remain committed” to their
school-choice agenda).
19. See Background on Betsy DeVos from the ACLU of Michigan, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/background-betsy-devos-aclu-michigan [https://perma.cc/84K37ZEV] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
20. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health & Human Servs., Educ. &
Related Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 115th Cong. 288–91 (2017) [hereinafter
Hearing]; see also Green, supra note 16.
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Indiana.21 When pressed, Secretary DeVos refused to indicate that schools
with discriminatory admissions policies would be denied public funding.22
School-choice programs are the subject of much contentious debate,23 and
there is conflicting evidence regarding their efficacy.24 However, this Note
takes no position on the value or desirability of such programs. Instead, this
Note investigates the potential protections for LGBT students who suffer
discrimination at the hands of voucher-accepting private schools. Even if
federal support for voucher programs does not expand,25 LGBT students are
still vulnerable to discrimination under existing state voucher programs.26
This Note’s proposed equal protection resolution to discrimination would
apply to existing state voucher programs, irrespective of federal expansion.27
The other proposed solution, the Title IX approach, would only apply to
schools receiving federal funding.28 Because existing potential protections
are flimsy at best, action is needed to ensure equal treatment of LGBT
students.29
Part I of this Note provides relevant background information, including a
brief history of voucher programs and jurisprudence underpinning the
legality of vouchers generally. Part II outlines the current potential remedies
available to discrimination victims by describing the potential remedies
available at the state level, a potential federal constitutional claim, and
potential federal statutory protection—all of which are insufficient
protection. Part III contemplates how to best provide protections for LGBT
students. First, Part III briefly explains that providing antidiscrimination
protections for LGBT students is a necessary and logical extension of the
U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in education discrimination and then
contemplates two potential routes to protecting LGBT students. Part III
ultimately concludes that the best way to protect LGBT students is for a

21. See Hearing, supra note 20, at 309; supra text accompanying notes 5–6; see also Peter
Balonon-Rosen, DeVos Grilled over LGBTQ Discrimination at Bloomington Voucher School,
IND. PUB. MEDIA (May 26, 2017), https://indianapublicmedia.org/stateimpact/2017/05/26/
devos-grilled-discrimination-bloomington-voucher-school/ [https://perma.cc/9FGB-GSN7].
22. Hearing, supra note 20, at 309–10.
23. See infra Part I.A (briefly explaining the debate).
24. See School Choice:
What the Research Says, CTR. FOR PUB. EDUC.,
http://www.centerforpubliceducation.org/research/school-choice-what-research-says
[https://perma.cc/87HH-SAXA] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (“In general, we find that school
choices work for some students sometimes, are worse for some students sometimes . . . .”);
see also GREG FORSTER, A WIN-WIN SOLUTION: THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SCHOOL
CHOICE 1 (4th ed. 2016), https://www.edchoice.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/2016-5Win-Win-Solution-WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/7C3W-XBML] (finding that some empirical
studies show that school-choice programs improve student outcomes, such as test scores,
whereas other studies show a negative impact on student outcomes).
25. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text.
26. See infra Part II.A (discussing the insufficiency of existing state-level protections).
27. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the proposed equal protection claim that a studentplaintiff could bring).
28. See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining the Title IX solution).
29. See infra Part III.B (discussing potential solutions to protect LGBT students).
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student-plaintiff30 to bring a federal equal protection claim and to argue for
a relaxed approach to state action.
I. HOW SCHOOL VOUCHERS HAVE BECOME VEHICLES FOR
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT STUDENTS
This Part provides background on the development of school voucher
programs as well as concerns about how voucher programs are used to
discriminate against LGBT students. Part I.A discusses the history of school
choice generally and explains the difference between voucher programs and
other school-choice mechanisms. Part I.A also describes the seminal
Supreme Court voucher case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,31 which solidified
the place of vouchers in the school-choice landscape. Part I.B details
discrimination concerns associated with voucher programs and describes
troubling instances of LGBT discrimination in private schools that accept
publicly funded vouchers.
A. School Choice Generally and the History of Voucher Programs
“School choice” refers to the practice of providing educational options
beyond traditional public schooling.32
Although options such as
homeschooling or online public schools are sometimes included in
conversations about school choice,33 the more commonly debated options,
such as vouchers, entail providing public money to fund attendance at private
schools.34
The earliest incarnations of state programs that fund private school
education developed nearly 140 years ago in Maine and Vermont.35 Those
programs—still in operation today—provided public money for rural
students living in areas without local public schools to attend private
schools.36 The modern notion of school choice traces its roots to economist
Milton Friedman’s 1955 paper, “The Role of Government in Education.”37
Friedman’s paper popularized the theory that using public dollars to fund

30. This term is used throughout this Note and encompasses anyone involved in a suit
based on discrimination against an LGBT student at the hands of a private school—for
example, the parents may sue on behalf of the child.
31. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
32. See School Choice: What the Research Says, supra note 24.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., Julie F. Mead, The Right to an Education or the Right to Shop for Schooling:
Examining Voucher Programs in Relation to State Constitutional Guarantees, 42 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 703, 705–06 (2015) (highlighting that vouchers are a “controversial” school-choice
mechanism).
35. School Vouchers, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
education/school-choice-vouchers.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9L7-WG92] (last visited Nov. 15,
2018).
36. Id.
37. See generally Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed., 1955).

1258

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

students’ attendance at private schools would increase student achievement
and competition among schools and would decrease education costs.38
It was not until the late 1980s and 1990s that school-choice programs were
“seriously debated as educational policy initiatives.”39 In 1989, the first
The
modern voucher program began in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.40
Milwaukee Parental Choice Program began operating in 1990 with the goal
of “provid[ing] educational freedom and choice to low-income parents in
Milwaukee who did not have the financial means to send their children to
private schools.”41 Thereafter, the first statewide school voucher program
targeting low-income families was born in Indiana in 2011.42
School-choice programs typically come in three forms: tax credit
scholarship programs, education savings accounts, and vouchers.43 In tuition
tax credit scholarship programs, sometimes called “neo-voucher” programs,
individuals or corporations donate to a state fund that then distributes
scholarships for eligible students to attend private schools.44 In return,
donors receive a tax credit.45 Education savings accounts are a mechanism
for parents to divert into a savings account all or part of the money the state
would normally use to fund their child’s public education.46 Parents may use
those funds to pay for “various approved educational expenses, including
private school tuition.”47
In a voucher program, the state offers parents vouchers that they can apply
to private school tuition for their children.48 The vouchers are funded by the
tax dollars that would otherwise pay for those students’ public education.49
Voucher programs have been the subject of contentious debate for many
years.50 The debate has created some unlikely bedfellows. For example,
liberals decrying the effects of failing public schools on minority youth and
conservatives seeking public funding for religious education have banded
38. See School Vouchers, supra note 35.
39. Suzanne E. Eckes, Julie Mead & Jessica Ulm, Dollars to Discriminate: The
(Un)intended Consequences of School Vouchers, 91 PEABODY J. EDUC. 537, 539 (2016).
40. School Vouchers, supra note 35.
41. The History of School Choice in Wisconsin, SCH. CHOICE WIS.,
https://www.chooseyourschoolwi.org/history/ [https://perma.cc/W6NZ-N2C9] (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018). Wisconsin expanded to a statewide model in 2013. Id.
42. School Vouchers, supra note 35.
43. See, e.g., Mead, supra note 34, at 705–06. Mead’s article comprehensively explains
which types of school-choice programs operate in each state. Id. Charter schools and magnet
schools are sometimes included in school-choice discussions, but are outside the scope of this
Note as they are both considered public schools. School Choice and Charters, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/school-choice-and-charters.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QNV8-L4WC] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018) (noting that both charter schools
and magnet schools are public schools).
44. Mead, supra note 34, at 705–06.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 706.
47. Id.
48. Michael Kavey, Note, Private Voucher Schools and the First Amendment Right to
Discriminate, 113 YALE L.J. 743, 745 (2003).
49. Id.
50. See generally Mead, supra note 34.
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together to support voucher programs.51 Proponents of voucher programs
highlight three benefits: (1) increasing educational opportunities for lowincome students by allowing them to escape their poorly performing public
schools;52 (2) incentivizing failing schools to do better;53 and (3) recognizing
the inherent value of allowing parents to choose a school based on what they
feel is best for their children.54 Opponents claim that voucher programs
facilitate racial segregation,55 threaten the public school system by diverting
already-scarce funds56 and create problematic church-state entanglement by
forcing or encouraging taxpayers to fund religious schools.57 Critics also
point to research suggesting that private schools do not provide better
educational outcomes than their public counterparts.58
Prior to 2002, one of the biggest debates regarding school vouchers was
whether permitting public funds to support students’ attendance at private,
religious schools violated the Establishment Clause.59 The first major case
to address this issue was Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist.60 In Nyquist, the Supreme Court considered three New
York state programs that provided financial aid to private schools.61 The first
was a direct grant program that provided money to private schools to be used
for maintenance and repair of facilities and equipment.62 The second was a
tuition-reimbursement plan for low-income parents whose children attended
a qualifying private school.63 The third was a tax deduction for parents who
51. See Kavey, supra note 48, at 745.
52. See generally Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, School Vouchers and Tax
Benefits in Federal and State Judicial Constitutional Analysis, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1335 (2016).
53. See School Vouchers, supra note 35.
54. See Brad J. Davidson, Comment, Balancing Parental Choice, State Interest, and the
Establishment Clause: Constitutional Guidelines for States’ School-Choice Legislation, 33
TEX. TECH L. REV. 435, 449 (2002).
55. Steven L. Nelson, Still Serving Two Masters? Evaluating the Conflict Between School
Choice and Desegregation Under the Lens of Critical Race Theory, 26 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 43,
44 (2017). Nelson also notes that school-choice policies frequently result in predominantly
white, unelected boards running schools in minority communities, often without minoritystakeholder representation on the board. Id. at 47.
56. See Oluwole & Green, supra note 52, at 1347.
57. See id. at 1347–48.
58. Addressing the question of the effectiveness of voucher programs is outside of the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of voucher effectiveness, see, for example, David Trilling,
School Vouchers and Student Achievement: Reviewing the Research, JOURNALIST’S
RESOURCE (Sept. 14, 2016), https://journalistsresource.org/studies/society/education/schoolvouchers-choice-student-achievement [https://perma.cc/RE9T-TPQ5], and School Choice:
What the Research Says, supra note 24.
59. The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” U.S. CONST. amend I.
To evaluate whether the Clause has been violated, courts employ the so-called “Lemon test,”
which asks: (1) whether the government’s action has a secular or a religious purpose; (2)
whether the primary effect of the government’s action is to advance or endorse religion; and
(3) whether the government’s policy or practice fosters an excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
60. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
61. Id. at 761–62.
62. Id. at 762–63.
63. Id. at 764–65.
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did not qualify for the tuition-reimbursement plan.64 The participating
schools were largely religious schools, primarily members of the Roman
Catholic Church.65 The Court determined that the programs all had the
impermissible effect of advancing religion and were therefore
unconstitutional.66 The decision seemed to inhibit the growth of schoolchoice programs for many years.67 However, the holding was limited to the
specific set of facts in the case68: namely, the provision of benefits
exclusively to private schools and parents of those schools;69 a program
structure “designed explicitly to . . . ‘incentiv[ize] . . . parents to send their
children to sectarian schools’”;70 and the programmatic purpose of propping
up private religious schools facing “increasingly grave fiscal problems.”71
The Court explicitly left open the question of whether “some form of public
assistance (e.g., [vouchers]) made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefited” may be permissible.72
That question was settled in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, in which the Court
held that state voucher programs that include religious schools do not
necessarily violate the Establishment Clause.73 In Zelman, the Court
addressed Cleveland’s voucher program.74 The program included two types
of financial assistance to parents whose children were in a qualifying school
district: (1) a tuition grant for parents to send their children to a participating
public or private school of the parent’s choosing, and (2) tutorial aid for
students who remained in public school.75 Eighty-two percent of the
participating private schools had a religious affiliation, and 96 percent of
participating students elected to enroll in religiously affiliated schools.76
Despite clear evidence that most of the state funding was going toward
supporting religious schools, the Court affirmed the constitutionality of the
program and emphasized the importance of parental choice as a cleansing
mechanism; the indirect nature of the aid, which passed first to parents and

64. Id. at 765–66.
65. Id. at 768.
66. Id. at 798.
67. See Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 540 (“Voucher programs involving private religious
schools were long considered unconstitutional after the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist.”).
68. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
69. Id. at 783.
70. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 661 (2002) (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at
786).
71. Id. (quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 795).
72. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 782 n.38.
73. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662–63.
74. Id. at 643. Schools in the Cleveland City School District were performing so
abysmally that “[i]n 1995, a Federal District Court declared a ‘crisis of magnitude’ and placed
the entire Cleveland school district under state control. . . . Only 1 in 10 ninth graders could
pass a basic proficiency examination . . . . More than two-thirds of high school students either
dropped or failed out before graduation.” Id. at 644.
75. Id. at 645.
76. Id. at 647.
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then to schools, was key to the Court’s decision.77 The Court held that
“where a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance . . . to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine
and independent private choice,” the program does not violate the
Establishment Clause.78 This decision solidified the position of voucher
programs as a viable component of the education landscape.79
B. Discrimination Concerns Associated with Vouchers
Although Zelman settled the Establishment Clause question, controversy
persists about voucher programs. One of the primary concerns is that
vouchers provide opportunities for state-sponsored discrimination.80 This
concern is justified by the historical relationship between vouchers and
discrimination81: “In fact, so-called ‘choice academies,’ private schools that
began in resistance to desegregation existed in several southern states,
including Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia.”82
Notably, three of those five states currently have voucher programs.83
Because private schools have broad discretion to operate as they wish,
many fear that the schools have the ability to discriminate against disfavored
groups, such as LGBT students or racial and religious minorities.84 Many
organizations have criticized voucher programs as offering the opportunity
for government subsidization of such discrimination.85 A wide array of wellrespected civil rights and educational groups have expressed these concerns
about vouchers, including the National Education Association, the National
Parent Teacher Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, the
National Alliance of Black School Educators, and the Leadership Conference
on Civil Rights.86
The concern about state-sponsored discrimination is not just theoretical.
In addition to the discrimination occurring in Indiana,87 private schools
77. Id. at 662–63; see Abner S. Greene, The Apparent Consistency of Religion Clause
Doctrine, 21 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 225, 232–34 (2006) (discussing the importance of the
indirect nature of the aid and how this opinion comports with prior Establishment Clause
cases).
78. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
79. Even though Zelman settled the Establishment Clause question, voucher litigation
continued at the state level. See generally Mead, supra note 34 (providing an in-depth analysis
of state voucher litigation).
80. See generally Eckes et al., supra note 39.
81. Id. at 538 (“Vouchers have a long history in relation to discrimination, particularly
racial segregation and resistance to adhere to the Supreme Court’s order to desegregate schools
in Brown v. Board of Education.”); see also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 457 (1973)
(noting that in Mississippi, “the creation and enlargement of [private schools] occurred
simultaneously with major events in the desegregation of public schools”).
82. Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 538–39.
83. See infra Part II.A.
84. Kavey, supra note 48, at 745–46; see also Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 539.
85. Kavey, supra note 48, at 745–46.
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 5–6.
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across the country are discriminating against LGBT people. For example, in
2010 a private elementary school in Greater Boston withdrew an eight-yearold student’s admission upon learning that his parents were lesbians.88 Also
in 2010, a Colorado preschooler was denied kindergarten enrollment when
the private school learned of his mothers’ sexual orientation.89 Stories like
these are disturbingly common.90 Yet even more disturbing than the
discrimination itself is that this discrimination occurs at schools that receive
government funding. At least 115 voucher-accepting schools in Georgia
have “severe antigay policies.”91 At least four voucher-accepting schools in
North Carolina admit to having anti-LGBT policies.92 Realistically, the
number of schools with anti-LGBT policies is likely even higher than
existing estimates—reported statistics “are likely an understatement”
because many schools do not publicize their admissions policies.93
In fact, there is even institutional guidance that encourages Christian
schools to adopt discriminatory policies. More than half of the schools in
Indiana with discriminatory policies are accredited by the Association of
Christian Schools International (ACSI).94 ACSI encourages discrimination
by providing its member schools with a handbook entitled Steps Your School
Can Take When Dealing with Homosexual Issues, which encourages schools
to adopt discriminatory policies by providing a model policy for schools to
use:
________ Christian School’s biblical role is to work in conjunction with
the home to mold students to be Christlike. Of necessity, this involves the
school’s understanding and belief of what qualities or characteristics
exemplify a Christlike life. The school reserves the right, within its sole
discretion, to refuse admission of an applicant or to discontinue enrollment
of a student if the atmosphere or conduct within a particular home or the
activities of the student are counter to or are in opposition to the biblical
lifestyle the school teaches. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to,
participating in, supporting, or condoning sexual immorality, homosexual
activity, or bisexual activity; promoting such practices; or being unable to
88. Jay Lindsay, Mass. Catholic School Won’t Admit Lesbians’ Son, BOSTON.COM (May
12, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2010/05/12/mass_
catholic_school_wont_admit_lesbians_son_1273691291/ [https://perma.cc/6EYE-CGNK].
89. Rosemary Black, Catholic School in Denver Denies Admission to Kindergartener
Because of Lesbian Parents, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.nydailynews.com/
news/national/catholic-school-denver-denies-admission-kindergartener-lesbian-parentsarticle-1.174272# [https://perma.cc/57PW-WTDS].
90. See, e.g., Rebecca Klein, These Schools Get Millions of Tax Dollars to Discriminate
Against
LGBTQ
Students,
HUFFINGTON
POST
(Dec.
16,
2017),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/discrimination-lgbt-private-religious-schools_us_
5a32a45de4b00dbbcb5ba0be [https://perma.cc/5KKF-F6J3].
91. Kim Severson, Backed by State Money, Georgia Scholarships Go to Schools Barring
Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/21/education/georgiabacked-scholarships-benefit-schools-barring-gays.html [https://perma.cc/YB6V-25P5].
92. Rachel Stone & Jane Little, Some Schools Get State Money, Deny Gay Enrollment,
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Aug. 12, 2016), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/news/local/
article95390197.html [https://perma.cc/9JNZ-72RG].
93. Donheiser, supra note 3.
94. Id.
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support the moral principles of the school. (See Leviticus 20:13 and
Romans 1:27.)95

Over 3000 schools in the United States are members of this pro-schoolchoice group.96
One might argue that given the difficulties LGBT students experience in
the school setting,97 they would want to find the most accepting
environments possible. In other words, some might say that because there
are plenty of schools without anti-LGBT policies, those students will
logically seek out and find acceptance at those schools, so there is no reason
for discriminatory schools to be forced to change. This conclusion fails for
two reasons: First, although LGBT students very well may not want to attend
schools with hateful admissions policies, the mere fact that they are
prohibited from attending is itself injurious. It signals to the students that
they are unequal and unworthy in the eyes of local institutions and
community members. Second, schools with anti-LGBT policies pose an
especially dangerous threat to currently enrolled students who are not out.98
Students are confronted with an impossible choice: continue to bear the
enormous burden of keeping secret an integral part of their identity99 or be
rejected by their community—forced to interrupt their education, leave their
friends, and be treated as a pariah.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO REMEDY LGBT DISCRIMINATION
ARE INSUFFICIENT
Students and their families who experience discrimination at the hands of
private schools may turn to the courts for a remedy in the hope that such
unfair treatment is legally prohibited. However, they will be disappointed to
find that few protections exist for LGBT students in either state or federal
law. Because LGBT students have little legal recourse when they are
discriminated against, they continue to occupy second-class-citizen status in
the United States.
This Part addresses various legal avenues through which a student-plaintiff
might hope to find protection from discrimination. First, this Part considers
potential state-level protections in the form of voucher statute provisions,

95. Id.
96. FAQs, ASS’N CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS INT’L, https://www.acsi.org/membership/acsioverview/faqs [https://perma.cc/R5AP-AGAH] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
97. See supra Introduction; infra Part III.A.1.
98. A student who is not “out” has not publicly disclosed his or her minority sexual
orientation or gender identity. For an explanation of some terms relating to sexual orientation
and gender identity, see Glossary of Terms, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, https://www.hrc.org/
resources/glossary-of-terms [https://perma.cc/M3RL-EPQB] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
99. Existing in unsupportive school environments can seriously increase mental health
risks, such as suicidal ideation, for LGBT students. See generally, e.g., Mark L.
Hatzenbuehler, Michelle Birkett, Aimee Van Wagenen & Ilan H. Meyer, Protective School
Climates and Reduced Risk for Suicide Ideation in Sexual Minority Youths, 104 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 279 (2014).
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state antidiscrimination laws, and state constitutions.100 Then, this Part
considers potential constitutional protections in the form of an equal
protection claim that is predicated upon a finding of “state action.” Finally,
this Part considers potential federal statutory protections. This Part
ultimately demonstrates that none of these options provide sufficient
protection for LGBT students.
A. State-Level Protections Are Insufficient
Currently, sixteen states have some form of publicly funded voucher
program.101 In these states, student-plaintiffs could look to three state-level
sources for potential discrimination remedies: the voucher statute, state
antidiscrimination statutes, and the state constitution.
A student-plaintiff searching for protection in a voucher statute will almost
uniformly be disappointed.
Though some programs include
nondiscrimination provisions in their enabling statutes,102 these provisions
are far from comprehensive or sufficient. Only a single state, Maryland,
prohibits participating schools from discriminating on the basis of sexual
orientation.103 Although the federal program in Washington, D.C. includes
a prohibition on sex discrimination, no state program does.104 Three
programs do not impose any explicit nondiscrimination requirement:
Maine,105 Nevada,106 and Vermont.107 In fact, some voucher programs seem
to contemplate future imposition of antidiscrimination norms and attempt to
preempt it.108 For example, Arizona’s legislature promised that a private
school “shall not be required to alter its creed, practices, admissions policy
or curriculum” in order to participate in the voucher program.109
100. Even when considering an expanded federal voucher program, the current landscape
of state voucher programs is instructive, especially since the structure of a potential future
federal expansion is unknown.
101. These states are Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi,
Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wisconsin, Eckes
et al., supra note 39, at 544, as well as Maryland, Boost Scholarship Program: Application
Information, U. MD., http://www.educationmaryland.org/BOOST [https://perma.cc/ZTD6KHXS] (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
102. For a comprehensive list of the specifics of each program, see Eckes et al., supra note
39, at 547. With the exception of Maine, Nevada, and Vermont, programs generally prohibit
discrimination based on race, color, and national origin. Id.
103. 2018 Md. Laws 2804–05.
104. Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 547. Note that this may be largely due to a desire to
protect the validity of single-sex schools; however, this goal can be achieved while also
providing for protection from discrimination. See infra Part III.B.1.
105. See ME. REV. STAT. tit. 20-A, § 2951 (2018).
106. See NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 388D.250–.280 (2018).
107. See VT. STAT. tit. 16, §§ 821–822 (2018).
108. See Eckes et al., supra note 39, at 550. Although it is worth noting that such provisions
could potentially be preempted by federal legislation or judicial rulings, the important
takeaway is what these provisions reveal about the intent of the states’ decision makers: a
desire to insulate schools with discriminatory policies from attempts to force open their
doors—with the exception of racial discrimination, which the legislators knew they could not
get away with.
109. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 15-2404 (2018).
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Nor is a student-plaintiff likely to find solace in state antidiscrimination
laws. Private acts of discrimination can be prohibited through public
accommodations laws. Typically, private landowners have the right to
exclude whoever they want from their land.110 However, most states have
laws that designate certain private properties “places of public
accommodation,” thereby limiting the property owner’s or business owner’s
right to exclude in order to prevent discriminatory practices.111 In order for
a student-plaintiff to bring a claim under a public accommodation law, the
law must (1) include sexual orientation in its list of protected classes, and
(2) include schools in its definition of places of public accommodation.
Three voucher states fail both prongs because they have no public
accommodation law at all: Georgia, Mississippi, and North Carolina.112
Most states with voucher programs fail the first prong. Arizona,113
Florida,114 Indiana,115 Louisiana,116 Ohio,117 Oklahoma,118 Tennessee,119
and Utah120 do not include sexual orientation as a protected class in their
public accommodation statutes. Maryland121 and Wisconsin122 fail the
second prong because their statutes do not include schools or educational
facilities in their definitions of places of public accommodation. While
Vermont does protect sexual orientation,123 it is unclear whether private
schools are covered.124 Of the sixteen voucher states, only two provide
110. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730,
730 (1998).
111. Forty-five states have public accommodation laws intended for nondisabled
individuals. All states with such a law prohibit discrimination based on race, gender, ancestry,
and religion. State Public Accommodation Law, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 13,
2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-public-accommodationlaws.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/4C4H-MYCE].
112. Id.
113. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1442 (2018).
114. FLA. STAT. §§ 413.08, 760.08 (2018).
115. IND. CODE § 22-9-1-2 (2018).
116. LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:2247 (2018).
117. OHIO REV. CODE § 4112.02 (2018).
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 25, § 1402 (2018).
119. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-501 (2018).
120. UTAH CODE § 13-7-3 (2018).
121. MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV’T §§ 20-301 to -304 (2018).
122. WIS. STAT. § 106.52(1)(e)(1) (2018). Although the Wisconsin statute does not
explicitly include schools in its enumerated list of places of public accommodation, there may
be an argument that schools should be included due to the open-ended language of the statute:
“‘Public place of accommodation or amusement’ shall be interpreted broadly to include, but
not be limited to [enumerated list] and any place where accommodations, amusement, goods,
or services are available . . . .” Id. Schools arguably provide a “service” in the form of
education.
123. VT. STAT. tit. 9, § 4502 (2018).
124. Id. § 4501 (“‘Place of public accommodation’ means any school, restaurant, store,
establishment, or other facility at which services, facilities, goods, privileges, advantages,
benefits, or accommodations are offered to the general public.”). Although schools are
included on the list, the phrase “offered to the general public” throws a wrench in the works.
On the one hand, private schools are arguably not offered to the general public in that they
typically have a selective admissions process—somewhat analogous to a private membership
club, which is typically exempted from public accommodation laws. On the other hand,
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unambiguous protection for LGBT students. Maine’s statute125 and
Nevada’s statute126 include sexual orientation as a protected class and
include schools as a place of public accommodation. Unless an LGBT
student is lucky enough to be discriminated against in Maine or Nevada, he
or she will not find protection in state antidiscrimination law.
Finally, a student-plaintiff will find no assistance in state constitutions. No
state constitution explicitly provides for protection of LGBT individuals who
are the subjects of educational discrimination.127 Fewer than half of all state
constitutions even contain a provision prohibiting sex discrimination.128 Of
the voucher states, only four have constitutional protections for sex:
Florida,129 Louisiana,130 Maryland,131 and Utah.132 Even if a state
constitutional provision did provide protection for LGBT people, a studentplaintiff would have to clear the difficult hurdle of demonstrating that the
school’s action constituted state action.133
In sum, a student-plaintiff will find no relief in a state constitution in any
state, public accommodation statutory protection in only two states, and
voucher program statutory protection in only one state. State-level
protections are insufficient to ensure that LGBT students are provided equal
access to educational opportunities and protected from invidious
discrimination.

accepting vouchers arguably opens the schoolhouse gate to the subset of the general public
that qualifies for the vouchers.
125. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4552–4553, 4591 (2018).
126. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 651.050, 651.070 (2018).
127. See ALA. CONST.; ALASKA CONST.; ARIZ. CONST.; ARK. CONST.; CAL. CONST.; COLO.
CONST.; CONN. CONST.; DEL. CONST.; FLA. CONST.; GA. CONST.; HAW. CONST.; IDAHO CONST.;
ILL. CONST.; IND. CONST.; IOWA CONST.; KAN. CONST.; KY. CONST.; LA. CONST.; ME. CONST.;
MD. CONST.; MASS. CONST.; MICH. CONST.; MINN. CONST.; MISS. CONST.; MO. CONST.; MONT.
CONST.; NEB. CONST.; NEV. CONST.; N.H. CONST.; N.J. CONST.; N.M. CONST.; N.Y. CONST.;
N.C. CONST.; N.D. CONST.; OHIO CONST.; OKLA. CONST.; OR. CONST.; PA. CONST.; R.I.
CONST.; S.C. CONST.; S.D. CONST.; TENN. CONST.; TEX. CONST.; UTAH CONST.; VT. CONST.;
VA. CONST.; WASH. CONST.; W. VA. CONST.; WIS. CONST.; WYO. CONST. Note that a limited
number of state constitutions may provide some level of protection via judicial interpretation
of their equal protection clauses. See, e.g., Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407
(Conn. 2008) (finding that sexual orientation is a quasi-suspect class for purposes of equal
protection analysis under the state constitution). One state constitution does textually provide
for sexual orientation protection, but only in the voting context. See ILL. CONST. art. III, § 8
(“No person shall be denied the right to register to vote or to cast a ballot in an election based
on . . . sexual orientation . . . .”).
128. See LESLIE W. GLADSTONE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20217, EQUAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENTS:
STATE PROVISIONS 1 (2004), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/
20040823_RS20217_ca058473694533d5becfe0493fcf17b79fe637bf.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5LRN-CLVW].
129. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
130. LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
131. MD. CONST. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 46.
132. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 1.
133. See infra Part II.B (discussing state action).
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B. Constitutional Protections Are Insufficient
To bring a federal constitutional claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) the violation of a constitutional right (here, Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection), and (2) that the right was violated by a state actor.134 An LGBT
student-plaintiff faces significant challenges under both prongs.
1. The Equal Protection Prong
The Constitution as originally ratified did not provide for equal protection
under the law.135 After more than a century of discrimination and
subjugation of racial minorities,136 the Fourteenth Amendment was passed in
the wake of the Civil War.137 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment states that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”138 The Equal Protection Clause
has become a vital tool for combating state discrimination,139 but it was
largely unused prior to the 1950s.140 The Supreme Court’s hesitation to find
that a state or local action violated the Equal Protection Clause may have
stemmed from the notion that virtually every law classifies people or treats
some people differently in some way.141 Equal protection as an
antidiscrimination tool gained prominence142 with Brown v. Board of
Education,143 where the Court struck down the “separate but equal”
justification for educational segregation. Although the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment only guarantees equal protection by the states,144 the Court
incorporated this protection against the federal government in Bolling v.
Sharpe.145
Courts address three central questions when evaluating an equal protection
claim146: (1) What is the classification created by the government’s
action?147 (2) What is the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny, given the

134. See infra Parts II.B.1–2.
135. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 684 (4th ed.
2011).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
139. See, e.g., LENORA M. LAPIDUS, EMILY J. MARTIN & NAMITHA LUTHRA, THE RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: THE AUTHORITATIVE ACLU GUIDE TO WOMEN’S RIGHTS 2 (4th ed. 2009) (“[T]he
Equal Protection Clause has been invoked often to invalidate policies such as racial
segregation in public schools, the denial of voting rights to African-Americans, and racially
exclusive public accommodations. It also extends to protect the rights of other groups, such
as immigrants, ethnic minorities, and women.”).
140. But see, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950) (finding that segregation in
Texas law schools violated the Equal Protection Clause).
141. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 684.
142. Id.
143. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 684.
145. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
146. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 685–90.
147. Id. at 686–87.
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type of discrimination at issue?148 (3) Does the government action meet the
level of scrutiny?149 In other words, does the government have a sufficiently
strong reason for the classification, and is the action appropriately tailored to
furthering that interest? This section will first discuss the three different
types of scrutiny used by reviewing courts and will then consider how courts
have treated sexual orientation in the equal protection context.
a. Three Levels of Scrutiny
The lowest level of scrutiny is rational-basis review.150 To survive an
equal protection challenge, a government action must simply be rationally
related to a legitimate government purpose.151 Because this standard is
extremely deferential,152 the vast majority of actions are upheld under
rational-basis review.153 Rational-basis review is used for all challenges that
do not involve one of a limited set of suspect classes, as discussed below.
The Supreme Court has applied rational-basis review to laws that create
classifications on the basis of, among other categories, socioeconomic
status,154 disability,155 and age.156
The next-highest level of scrutiny is intermediate scrutiny.157 After years
of grappling with what level of scrutiny to apply to gender classifications,158
the Court finally announced a standard in Craig v. Boren159: intermediate
scrutiny.160 The Court held that to pass constitutional muster, gender
classifications must serve “important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives.”161 The Court
seemed to alter the standard in United States v. Virginia162—Justice
Ginsburg’s opinion held that the government must demonstrate “an
exceedingly persuasive justification” for that action,163 which many scholars

148. Id. at 687–89.
149. Id. at 689–90.
150. Id. at 688.
151. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955).
152. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961) (“The constitutional
safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State’s objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within
their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.
Statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived
to justify it.”).
153. LAPIDUS ET AL., supra note 139, at 4.
154. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 55 (1973).
155. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
156. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312–13 (1976).
157. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 687.
158. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971). But see, e.g., Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973).
159. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
160. Id. at 197.
161. Id.
162. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
163. Id. at 531 (quoting Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
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interpret as raising the bar even higher for gender classifications.164
Intermediate scrutiny is used primarily in the gender context.165
The highest level of scrutiny is strict scrutiny.166 Under strict scrutiny, a
government classification will be allowed only if it is narrowly tailored to
further a compelling government interest.167 In this unforgiving analysis, the
government must demonstrate that its compelling goal cannot be
accomplished through any less discriminatory method.168 Strict scrutiny
applies to all racial classifications169—even if they are intended to benefit
minorities, such as affirmative action programs170—as well as alienage
classifications.171
b. Sexual Orientation in the Equal Protection Context
The Court has discussed disparate treatment of people based on their
sexual orientation on a handful of occasions. Although the Court has not
explicitly treated sexual orientation as a suspect class meriting a higher level
of scrutiny than rational basis review, the arc of the cases suggests application
of some heightened scrutiny. This section offers a brief review of these cases
to illustrate how a court might treat a student-plaintiff’s equal protection
claim based on sexual-orientation discrimination.
In Romer v. Evans,172 the Court considered a challenge to a Colorado state
constitutional amendment.173 The amendment, adopted in a 1992 statewide
referendum, prohibited any form of government action—legislative,
executive, or judicial—intended to protect lesbian, gay, or bisexual people
from discrimination.174 The Colorado Supreme Court relied on federal
voting-rights cases to find that the amendment infringed on the fundamental

164. See LAPIDUS ET AL., supra note 139, at 7.
165. Id. at 6.
166. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 687.
167. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986).
168. Id.
169. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), abrogated by Trump
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
170. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (upholding
an affirmative action program while acknowledging that strict scrutiny is the proper standard
of review and that not all affirmative action programs will withstand muster under that
exacting standard).
171. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
172. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
173. Id. at 623.
174. The amendment read:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any
of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact,
adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual,
lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or
otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim
any minority status, quota preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination.
This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Id. at 624.
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right of LGB175 people to participate in the political process.176 Because the
amendment infringed on a fundamental right, the Colorado Supreme Court
applied strict scrutiny and invalidated the amendment.177 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment, but on different
grounds.178 The Supreme Court agreed with the Colorado court’s rejection
of the petitioners’ argument that rather than “put[ting] gays and lesbians in
the same position as all other persons,” the amendment actually did “no more
than deny homosexuals special rights.”179 Rather than focusing on
fundamental rights, though, the Supreme Court invalidated the amendment
using the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.180 The
Court did not specifically address whether heightened scrutiny should apply
to sexual orientation as a class; the Court seemed to skirt the question by
holding that “even in the ordinary equal protection case calling for the most
deferential of standards”—rational-basis review—the amendment fails
because it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests.181 Even
if the decision is viewed as nominally applying rational-basis review, some
commentators see “rational basis with bite” or “rational basis plus”—a
heightened level of scrutiny that suggests the Court may view sexual
orientation as a suspect class meriting additional protection.182 However, the
magnitude of the discrimination in Romer may have been the deciding factor:
“lower courts have consistently distinguished Romer on the basis of the
distinctive breadth of the harm inflicted by [the amendment at issue].”183 In
any case, Romer was the first time the Court used equal protection to protect
people from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.184
Additionally, “Romer establishe[d] that animus against gays and lesbians,
even when presented as a purported ‘moral’ basis for a law, is not sufficient
to meet the rational basis test.”185
The Court next addressed sexual orientation in Lawrence v. Texas.186
When Houston police responded to a reported weapons disturbance, they saw
petitioner John Lawrence engaged in a consensual sexual act with another
175. The acronym LGB is used here because the amendment did not refer to transgender
individuals. See id.
176. Id. at 625.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 626. Note that such an argument could be advanced in the context of private
school admissions. The precedent set in Romer would likely quash such an attempt.
180. Id. at 631–36.
181. Id. at 632.
182. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 778
(2011) (“Romer has been read as a ‘rational basis with bite’ case.”); see also CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 135, at 808 (“[T]he decision indicates at least some judicial willingness to protect
gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from discrimination.”); Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws of
Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of
Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
2769, 2770 (2005).
183. Yoshino, supra note 182, at 778.
184. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 808.
185. Id.
186. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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man.187 Both men were arrested and convicted of violating a Texas statute
prohibiting “deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same
The trial court rejected the petitioners’ equal protection
sex.”188
challenge.189 The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District also
rejected the challenge after considering arguments under both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.190 The court of appeals relied on Bowers v. Hardwick,191 a
Supreme Court case that upheld a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy
altogether.192 However, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the reliance
on Bowers.193 Noting that both the Texas and Georgia sodomy laws
implicated the fundamental right to privacy,194 the Court held that a state
cannot prohibit private, consensual homosexual activity, overturning Bowers
in the process.195 Because the Court felt compelled to address Bowers, it
chose to render its decision under the Due Process Clause and not the Equal
Protection Clause.196 Nevertheless, the Court emphasized that “[e]quality of
treatment and the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected
by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects”197
and again signaled an intention to prevent sexual-orientation
discrimination.198
In United States v. Windsor,199 the Court considered a provision of the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).200 Section 3 of DOMA, enacted in 1996,
defines marriage, for the purposes of federal law, as a union between one
man and one woman.201 Edie Windsor wed her wife, Thea Spyer, in Canada
in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by their home state of New
187. Id. at 562–63.
188. Id. at 563 (quoting the Texas statute).
189. See id. at 563.
190. Id.
191. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
192. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 563, 566.
193. See id. at 578.
194. See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (considering the fundamental
right to privacy).
195. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–79.
196. Id. at 574–75 (“As an alternative argument in this case, counsel for the petitioners and
some amici contend that Romer provides the basis for declaring the Texas statute invalid under
the Equal Protection Clause. That is a tenable argument, but we conclude the instant case
requires us to address whether Bowers itself has continuing validity. Were we to hold the
statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition
would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and
different-sex participants.”). Kenji Yoshino argues that, although deciding the case on equal
protection grounds would have allowed the Court to avoid the admission of error required by
overturning Bowers, the Court declined to do so partially in order to avoid declaring the level
of scrutiny that should apply to a sexual orientation equal protection challenge. See Yoshino,
supra note 182, at 777–78.
197. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 575.
198. See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 182, at 779 (“Indeed, Lawrence arguably more
resoundingly endorses the equality of gay and straight individuals than does Romer.”).
199. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
200. Id. at 2682.
201. Id. at 2683.
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York.202 However, because federal law did not recognize same-sex marriage
under DOMA, the federal government imposed over $363,000 in taxes when
Spyer died and left her estate to Windsor.203 The district court held that
section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, and the Second Circuit affirmed
after applying heightened scrutiny based on the sexual-orientation
classification.204 The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit on the
grounds that defining marriage was the purview of state governments and
that DOMA “violate[d] basic due process and equal protection principles.”205
Once again, the Court avoided the question of what level of scrutiny should
apply to a sexual-orientation equal protection challenge by stating that the
statute had “no legitimate purpose” because “no legitimate purpose
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”206
Nonetheless, Justice Anthony Kennedy’s repeated talk of dignity207 and
sweeping language about equality208 further supplemented the trend toward
treating sexual orientation as a suspect classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Finally, the Court interpreted the Constitution as guaranteeing marriage
equality in Obergefell v. Hodges.209 The Obergefell appeal came from
fourteen same-sex couples and two men whose same-sex partners were
deceased.210 The petitioners challenged the Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and
Tennessee laws restricting marriage to a union between one man and one
woman.211 Each of the petitioners originally won the right to marry in their
respective district courts, but the states appealed the decisions.212 The Sixth
Circuit consolidated the various cases during the appeals process and
overturned the judgments in favor of permitting gay marriage.213 The
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision and held that same-sex
marriage bans violate both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.214 Justice Kennedy did not explicitly ground his
decision exclusively in either a due process or equal protection rationale;

202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2684.
205. Id. at 2693.
206. Id. at 2696.
207. See, e.g., id. at 2688, 2692–93.
208. See, e.g., id. at 2694 (“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code.”).
209. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
210. Id. at 2593.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 2604–05. (“[T]he right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of
the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. The
Court now holds that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry. No
longer may this liberty be denied to them.”).

2018]

PUBLIC DOLLARS, PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION

1273

rather, he treated the two as necessarily intertwined.215 Like the three
preceding decisions, the Obergefell opinion “did not use the magic words of
‘heightened scrutiny.’”216 Nonetheless, the substance of the opinion clearly
indicates some level of scrutiny beyond rational basis.217 For example, the
Court goes to great lengths to detail the history of discrimination against
LGBT people,218 the immutable nature of sexual orientation,219 and the lack
of political power of LGBT people,220 all of which are factors utilized by the
Court when performing a heightened-scrutiny analysis, but not a rationalbasis review.221
c. A Student-Plaintiff’s Equal Protection Claim
The Romer-Obergefell line of cases suggests that a reviewing court would
apply some level of heightened scrutiny to a student-plaintiff’s equal
protection claim. None of the cases appear to apply true rational-basis
review, under which virtually any government action can survive as long as
some conceivable government interest is at play. If heightened scrutiny is
applied, a student-plaintiff may well prevail—the weight of his or her interest
in being free from discrimination could tip the scales in his or her favor.
Nonetheless, success is far from certain for a student-plaintiff. Even
though the Romer-Obergefell line of cases suggests application of heightened
scrutiny, the outcome may depend on the context; notably, none of the
Romer-Obergefell cases dealt with a private, religious organization such as a
parochial school, which has a significant free-exercise interest. Furthermore,
the Court still has not explicitly designated sexual orientation as a suspect
class that would merit heightened scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.
This ambiguity leaves room for an interpreting court to apply back-to-basics,
heavily deferential rational-basis review. Given the extreme deference of
that standard, a student-plaintiff’s claim would likely fail under that analysis.
Even under a fuzzy “rational basis plus” review, there is no guarantee that a
student-plaintiff would prevail, given the unclear boundaries of such a
review.
2. The State Action Prong
Even assuming a student-plaintiff does have a viable equal protection
claim against a school, the student-plaintiff must jump over the state action
215. See Jack B. Harrison, At Long Last Marriage, 24 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L.
1, 53 (2015) (interpreting Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion to mean “that no choice between
due process and equal protection analysis need be made, because as [Justice Kennedy] sees
the Constitution, these two constitutional clauses are inextricably tied together under the
umbrella of personal dignity”).
216. Autumn L. Bernhardt, The Profound and Intimate Power of the Obergefell Decision:
Equal Dignity as a Suspect Class, 25 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 1, 11 (2016).
217. See id.
218. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596; Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 23–24.
219. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2594; Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 28–29.
220. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605–06; Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 37–38.
221. See Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 22–41.
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hurdle in order to make a viable claim. As a general rule, the constitutional
obligation of equal protection only applies to the government.222 In other
words, the Constitution in isolation does not generally prohibit
discrimination by private actors, like private schools.223 Thus, in order for a
student-plaintiff to succeed on an equal protection claim, the student-plaintiff
must be able to demonstrate that the private school’s action implicated the
state such that the action of the school can fairly be treated as the action of
the state.224 This concept is known as the “state action” doctrine—
constitutional protections apply only where the state225 is acting. This
section outlines the Supreme Court’s treatment of the state action doctrine,
both in general and in contexts particularly relevant to, or similar to, voucher
schools.
a. History and Development of the Doctrine
The state action doctrine has a long history—its roots are typically traced
back to the Civil Rights Cases.226 Since then, state action jurisprudence has
developed to become notoriously convoluted and inconsistent.227
Historically, the Court has found state action in only two circumstances:
(1) where a private actor is providing a public function that is “traditionally
[and] exclusively reserved to the State,”228 or (2) where there is significant
222. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 519.
223. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 519. There are exceptions. For example, the
Thirteenth Amendment regulates private conduct by forbidding slavery. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United
States . . . .”). Of course, Congress or state legislatures can enact statutes that subject private
conduct to the same constitutional norms that apply to the government. CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 135, at 519.
224. The analysis of whether the school’s action was “under color of law” per 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 merges with the search for state action. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794
n.7 (1966) (“In cases under § 1983, ‘under color’ of law has consistently been treated as the
same thing as the ‘state action’ required under the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
225. In this context, “state” is a general term referring to all levels of government—federal,
state, and local. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 519.
226. 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (invalidating the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited racial
discrimination in certain places of public accommodation or amusement). However, the
doctrine was actually referenced in two earlier cases: United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1875), and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). See Terri Peretti, Constructing the
State Action Doctrine, 1940–1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 275–76 (2010); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 507–508 (1985). For
further discussion of the history of the state action doctrine, which highlights the ways in
which the modern doctrine does not comport with historical legal thinking, see CHEMERINSKY,
supra note 135, at 524, which explains that when the Constitution was written, it did not apply
to private conduct because “it was thought that the common law completely safeguarded
personal liberties from private infringements.”
227. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 632 (1991) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting) (“[O]ur cases deciding when private action might be deemed that of the state
have not been a model of consistency.”); Charles L. Black, Jr., Foreword: “State Action,”
Equal Protection, and California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (calling
state action a “conceptual disaster area”).
228. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
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state entanglement in the private action, that is, where the state itself actively
encouraged or compelled the specific conduct in question229 or where “there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of
the regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that
of the State itself.”230 The entanglement approach essentially evaluates
whether the government directly exerted control over the action in question.
The public-function approach has very rarely been successful.231
Providing utilities,232 providing education services,233 managing
intercollegiate athletics,234 and coordinating U.S. involvement in the
Olympics235 have all been rejected by the Supreme Court as not sufficiently
traditional or exclusive functions of the state to qualify as a public
function.236 The entanglement approach has also found limited success.237
In general, successful entanglement cases tend to fall into four areas238:
judicial and law enforcement actions,239 government licensing,240 direct
government subsidies,241 and voter initiatives permitting discrimination.242
However, the Court has made clear that entanglement does not exist solely

229. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972) (“Our holdings indicate that
where the impetus for the discrimination is private, the State must have ‘significantly involved
itself with invidious discriminations’ in order for the discriminatory action to fall within the
ambit of the constitutional prohibition.” (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380
(1967))); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) (“[A] State is responsible
for the discriminatory act of a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.”).
230. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982) (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351).
231. See Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1995) (describing “significant curtailment of the public
function theory”); Sheila S. Kennedy, When Is Private Public? State Action in the Era of
Privatization and Public-Private Partnerships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 203, 211 (2001)
(noting that the original public-function case, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), “has
been so strictly limited as to suggest a very narrow scope indeed for the public function test”).
232. Jackson, 419 U.S. at 358.
233. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 836–37 (1982).
234. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 197–99 (1988).
235. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 547 (1987).
236. Maren Hulden, Note, Charting a Course to State Action: Charter Schools and § 1983,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1259 (2011). But see, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57 (1988)
(finding that the provision of medical services in a state prison is a public function, which
renders the treating physician a state actor).
237. Hulden, supra note 236, at 1260.
238. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 539.
239. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1948) (holding that courts cannot
enforce racially restrictive covenants).
240. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (finding that,
where the city operated a parking facility that leased space to a private, discriminatory
restaurant, the discrimination constituted state action due to the government’s involvement).
241. See, e.g., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974) (finding that state
action may exist where the city gave racially segregated private schools exclusive use of public
recreational facilities); see also Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470–71 (1973).
242. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (finding that the government’s
encouragement of a ballot initiative repealing open housing laws was unconstitutional).
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on the basis of public funding243 or extensive state regulation.244 There must
be additional factors suggesting government encouragement or direct
facilitation of unconstitutional conduct.245
b. State Action Cases in the School Context
The Supreme Court has not ruled directly on the question of how a typical
voucher program affects the private character of a school in a student’s
discrimination suit. However, three recent cases provide relevant insight into
how the Court may consider such a case.
The Court considered the public funding of a discriminatory private school
in Norwood v. Harrison.246 In Norwood, parents of four black children
challenged a state-run textbook-lending program in Mississippi that provided
free textbooks to public and private schools across the state, including private
schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies.247 Here, there was
clear state action: the state provided direct financial support in the form of
free textbooks. Even though there was no indication that the state encouraged
the schools to discriminate or that there was other government entanglement,
the Court found that providing financial support via textbooks was enough to
constitute a violation of the students’ equal protection rights.248 The Court
noted that it has “consistently affirmed decisions enjoining state tuition
grants to students attending racially discriminatory private schools”249 and
found no meaningful distinction between tuition grants and textbooks.250
The Court highlighted that “discriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive
influence on the entire educational process” and that although “private bias
is not barred by the Constitution . . . neither can it call on the Constitution for
material aid from the State.”251 Furthermore, the Court rejected the argument
that the intention of fostering quality education for all students (by ensuring
that students whose parents chose to send them to a discriminatory school
would not miss out on the benefits of the free textbooks) did not overcome
the discriminatory effect of the program.252 However, the Court was careful
to note that not all government support of discriminatory private schools was

243. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840–42 (1982) (finding that, in an employment
discrimination suit where the state had no power to regulate personnel, near-complete reliance
on state funding did not amount to a close enough nexus to constitute state action).
244. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974).
245. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 135, at 544–51.
246. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
247. Id. at 457.
248. See id. at 463–64.
249. Id. at 463 (listing cases).
250. Id. at 463–64.
251. Id. at 469.
252. Id. at 466–67 (“[G]ood intentions as to one valid objective do not serve to negate the
State’s involvement in violation of a constitutional duty.”). This clear statement should
preclude a discriminatory voucher-accepting private school from successfully using an
identical argument.
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prohibited.253 Notably, the Court did not address how much it weighed the
direct nature of the state aid in the Mississippi textbook program, leaving
open the question of whether indirect state aid, such as vouchers, may be
treated differently.
The Court next considered public funding in the private school context in
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn.254 New Perspectives School was a private, not-forprofit institution that specialized in educating students who had trouble
completing a public high school degree, often due to drug or alcohol
problems or other special needs.255 When students were referred to the
school by city or state officials, the municipalities funded the students’ tuition
at New Perspectives.256 In the years leading up to the litigation, virtually all
students at New Perspectives were referrals, so state funding accounted for
between 90 and 99 percent of the school’s operating budget.257 Several
teachers and the petitioner, a guidance counselor, voiced opposition to a
school policy.258 When they were subsequently fired, they brought suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of their due process and First
Amendment rights.259 Relying on Blum v. Yaretsky,260 the Court held that
receipt of public funds alone was not enough to find state action.261 Using
the framework from Blum, the Court was looking for “coercive power”262
from the state with regards to the particular issue at hand—in this case, the
personnel decision. The Court also analogized a private school to an
infrastructure or defense contractor:
The school . . . is not fundamentally different from many private
corporations whose business depends primarily on contracts to build roads,
bridges, dams, ships, or submarines for the government. Acts of such
private contractors do not become acts of the government by reason of their
significant or even total engagement in performing public contracts.263

Furthermore, the Court rejected the public-function argument, finding that
while “the education of maladjusted high school students is a public
function,” it is not the “exclusive province of the State.”264 The Court further
noted that “the State had not undertaken to provide education for students
who could not be served by traditional public schools.”265
253. Id. at 465 (“We do not suggest that a State violates its constitutional duty merely
because it has provided any form of state service that benefits private schools said to be racially
discriminatory.” (emphasis omitted)).
254. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
255. Id. at 832.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 833–35.
259. Id. at 834–35.
260. 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (finding no state action where staff at a nursing facility that
received state Medicaid funds recommended the discharge or transfer of patients without
control or regulation by the state).
261. See Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840.
262. Id. (quoting Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004).
263. Id. at 840–41.
264. Id. at 842.
265. Id.
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In Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n,266
the Court did not address public funding of a private school, but the case
provides useful insight because it seemed to signal a slightly new approach
to state action generally.267 Brentwood Academy (“Brentwood”), a private
school outside Nashville, was a voluntary member of the Tennessee
Secondary School Athletic Association (TSSAA), a not-for-profit
organization that coordinated sports competitions among public and private
high schools in Tennessee.268 In 1997, the TSSAA placed Brentwood on
probation for violating a rule against “undue influence” in recruiting
athletes.269 Brentwood sued the TSSAA, claiming that the TSSAA was a
state actor and that its enforcement of the rule was a violation of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.270 The district court ruled in favor of Brentwood,
and the Sixth Circuit reversed after finding no state action under any of the
traditional frameworks.271 On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the
Sixth Circuit by eschewing the rationale that state action could be found only
under the traditional, structured approach of past cases.272 The Court noted
the long-standing precedent that “the character of a legal entity is determined
neither by its expressly private characterization in statutory law, nor by the
failure of the law to acknowledge the entity’s inseparability from recognized
government officials or agencies.”273 The Court went on to emphasize that
a state action analysis is a “necessarily fact-bound inquiry”274 and morphed
the nexus-entanglement approach into a flexible, fact-based inquiry that
Justice David Souter referred to as “entwinement.”275 Furthermore, the
Court noted that, although the public-function and nexus-entanglement
precedents may be a helpful guide, the Court is not limited to finding state
action only in those narrow circumstances.276 The Court found significant
that the TSSAA was staffed and operated almost entirely by public school
officials,277 state board of education members served ex officio on the board
of the TSSAA,278 and TSSAA employees were eligible for state retirement
benefits.279
266. 531 U.S. 288 (2001).
267. See Hulden, supra note 236, at 1263.
268. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 291.
269. Id. at 293.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 293–94.
272. Id. 294–302.
273. Id. at 296 (citing Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374 (1995)).
274. Id. at 298 (quoting Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982)).
275. See id. at 291; Hulden, supra note 236, at 1262–64.
276. Brentwood, 531 U.S. at 301–04 (“Facts that address any of [the] criteria [of the public
function or coercion tests] are significant, but no one criterion must necessarily be applied. . . .
[T]he implication of state action is not affected by pointing out that the facts might not loom
large under a different test.”).
277. Id. at 300 (“There would be no recognizable Association, legal or tangible, without
the public school officials, who do not merely control but overwhelmingly perform all but the
purely ministerial acts by which the Association exists and functions in practical terms.”).
278. Id.
279. Id.
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c. Private Schools as State Actors Under Current Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court’s state action jurisprudence is not promising for a
student-plaintiff because a public-function argument is almost certain to fail
as a matter of course. Public function applies only in very rare scenarios
because, although the government performs many functions, few have been
exclusively the purview of the state.280 There is a long history of private
schooling in the United States, so the public-function argument has found
little success in court.281 Nor is there much hope for the traditional
entanglement argument. Nothing suggests that states compel or encourage
private schools to maintain discriminatory admissions policies.
Even using Brentwood’s flexible, fact-based approach, direct application
of recent state action precedent suggests that a court would not find state
action in a student-plaintiff’s claim. Rendell-Baker made clear that public
funding alone is not sufficient to render a private entity’s action state action,
even when the public funding is responsible for virtually the entire operating
budget of the private entity.282 Nor is a private entity’s governance by state
regulations in and of itself enough to establish state action,283 so a state’s
limited regulatory oversight of private schools would not suffice. The
regulations that do govern private schools tend to relate to educational
standards, not admissions policies, and courts primarily consider whether
regulation exists in the specific area at issue.284 By analogizing a private
school to any other business that contracts with the government, RendellBaker suggests that the Court will not treat the educational context as a
unique one that merits special treatment.285 Further, a student-plaintiff’s
claim would be distinguishable from the facts of Brentwood—by nature,
most private schools lack public-official involvement, which is a factor the
Brentwood Court weighed heavily.286
Finally, although the Court prohibited direct federal aid to a racially
discriminatory private school in Norwood v. Harrison, the indirect nature of
voucher funding could prove problematic for a student-plaintiff. The Court
has not clarified whether the funding is “cleansed” for equal protection
purposes by passing through the hands of parents before going to schools,

280. See, e.g., Hulden, supra note 236, at 1259, 1266.
281. See Cory A. DeCresenza, Note, Rethinking the Effect of Public Funding on the StateActor Status of Private Schools in First Amendment Freedom of Speech Actions, 59 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 471, 498–99 (2009); see also Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 (1982);
Makofsky, supra note 6, at 970 (noting that the Court has declined to find education to be an
exclusively public function “because private schools have long existed alongside public
education”).
282. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840; see also Hulden, supra note 236, at 1260 n.89.
283. See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (“The mere fact that a
business is subject to state regulation does not by itself convert its action into that of the State
for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); see also Hulden, supra note 236, at 1260 n.90.
284. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 841–42.
285. Id. at 840–41.
286. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001);
see supra notes 277–79 and accompanying text.
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but the precedent set in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris in the Establishment
Clause context suggests that it could be.
In summary, chances are slim that a court would find state action in a
student-plaintiff’s equal protection claim against a private school. Courts are
hesitant to find state action in the first place, and precedent suggests that they
would be especially hesitant to find state action in this context. Because a
student-plaintiff would need to show a violation of equal protection and
establish that the private school is a state actor, it is unlikely that a studentplaintiff would have a successful case under the U.S. Constitution.
C. Federal Antidiscrimination Law Does Not Sufficiently Protect
LGBT Students
Finally, a student-plaintiff may turn to federal antidiscrimination law in an
attempt to find vindication. Unlike constitutional law, federal legislation
typically does apply to private actors.287 Federal antidiscrimination law
covers a range of contexts, from employment to voting rights.288 The
contexts relevant to a rejected LGBT student are (1) education, and (2) the
making and enforcement of contracts, since private school admission is
simply a contract between the parents and the school. Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) governs discrimination in
education.289 Title IX contains no provision prohibiting discrimination based
on sexual orientation.290 Additionally, Title IX directs that the statutory
protections do not apply to primary or secondary school admissions.291
Discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts is governed by
42 U.S.C. § 1981.292 It contains no provision prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation.293 In short, Congress has enacted no relevant
law that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, so a
student-plaintiff would find no protection in federal antidiscrimination
law.294

287. Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79. Of course, the federal legislative power is not
unlimited. Congress must act according to an enumerated power. See CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 135, at 238.
288. Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978 (“The forums that federal antidiscrimination laws
cover include: voting rights, access to public facilities and accommodations, discrimination
in education, discrimination within federally assisted programs, discrimination in
employment, and discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts.”).
289. 20 U.S.C § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
290. See Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79.
291. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a); infra Part IV.B.
292. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like
punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.”).
293. See id.; see also Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79.
294. See Makofsky, supra note 6, at 978–79.
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III. PROVIDING PROTECTION FOR LGBT STUDENTS
As it stands, LGBT students are vulnerable to being victims of
discrimination at the hands of private schools. Despite the fact that taxpayer
dollars fund students’ vouchers, private schools have an unchecked license
to deny admission to or expel LGBT students solely based on their sexual
orientation or gender identity. No state law, constitutional provision, or
federal law prevents this brutal discrimination.295 Action is needed to ensure
that LGBT students are treated with the same dignity as their heterosexual
peers. Part III.A describes why protections are necessary and logical. Part
III.B explains two potential ways students could obtain protection:
(1) Congress could mold Title IX to cover sexual orientation; or (2) a studentplaintiff could bring an equal protection claim and argue for a relaxed
application of the state action doctrine.
A. Why Preventing Discrimination Is Logical and Necessary
Preventing school-admissions discrimination is essential to protecting the
health and success of LGBT children296 and is a natural extension of the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.297
1. Protections Are Necessary
Discrimination against LGBT people is highly problematic in general,298
but it is especially despicable in the context of school voucher programs.
Courts have long recognized the virtually unmatched societal importance of
education.299 School is where children learn a vast range of skills necessary
to survive in modern society, from social skills and empathy to creative
thinking and problem-solving.300 The unique instructional nature of a school
demonstrates the inaccuracy of the Rendell-Baker Court’s attempt to
analogize private school admission to any other business contract.301
Unequal access to education can fundamentally handicap a child in a way
that no regular business contract can.
Courts should consider the unique importance of the educational
environment in any analysis involving a school, but especially in the context
of school voucher programs. In the voucher context, allowing sexualorientation discrimination to persist may be tantamount to relegating LGBT
students to an inferior education given that many voucher programs develop
295. See supra Part II.
296. See infra Part III.A.1.
297. See infra Part III.A.2.
298. See supra Part I.B.
299. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“[I]t is doubtful that any child
may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.”).
300. See Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and the Socialization of Children:
Compulsory Public Education and Vouchers, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 503, 513–14
(2002); see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
301. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
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in response to failing public schools.302 It is not difficult to imagine a rural
setting in which a voucher program developed in response to an inadequate
public school system and where few private schools exist. If the one or two
participating private schools in the area have discriminatory policies, LGBT
students will be forced to accept an education that the government itself has
acknowledged is inadequate by establishing a voucher program to provide
alternative options to public schooling.
In addition to the destructive educational consequences of discrimination,
prohibiting LGBT students from having equal access to schooling
opportunities may have traumatic sociopsychological effects.303 The school
environment plays a formative role in a child’s sociopsychological
Rejection in the school environment is uniquely
development.304
damaging.305 The Supreme Court has long acknowledged that allowing
schools to discriminate gives the disfavored population the degrading mark
of institutionalized inferiority.306 Being rejected from a school because of
sexual orientation, or even the knowledge that one could be rejected based
on sexual orientation, may contribute to a vast range of negative outcomes
for LGBT children, including higher risk of drug use, higher risk of suicidal
ideation, and lower rates of academic success.307
2. Protections Are Logical
The Supreme Court has already laid the groundwork for instituting
protections for LGBT students, and doing so in this context would not be a
major departure from the Court’s jurisprudence. First, the Court has
repeatedly acknowledged that discrimination has no place in education. In
Norwood v. Harrison, the Court explicitly acknowledged that “[f]ree
textbooks, like tuition grants directed to private school students, are a form
of financial assistance inuring to the benefit of the private schools
themselves” and held it unconstitutional for the government to provide
financial support to racially discriminatory schools.308 Vouchers are exactly
the kind of tuition grant the Court referred to when stating that government
aid that goes to discriminatory schools is constitutionally problematic.
Although the facts of the case involved racial discrimination, Norwood
makes several broadly disapproving statements about discrimination
generally and suggests that the reasoning in the opinion could apply to other
302. See, e.g., Oluwole & Green, supra note 52, at 1337 (“Given many Americans’
dissatisfaction with their local public schools, some municipalities have looked to
vouchers . . . to help fund their children’s education at private schools.”). See generally
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
303. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text.
304. See generally Orly Rachmilovitz, No Queer Child Left Behind, 51 U.S.F. L. REV. 203
(2017).
305. See id. at 220–24.
306. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954). Although the scope and vitriol
of racial school segregation is unmatched, the principle still holds when applied to the
exclusion of LGBT students from private schools.
307. See Rachmilovitz, supra note 304, at 204–05.
308. 413 U.S. 455, 463–64 (1973).
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forms of discrimination.309 Preventing state-sponsored discrimination
against LGBT students—even if the state aid at issue is provided indirectly
via parental choice—is a logical outgrowth of Norwood.
Another seminal school discrimination case, Runyon v. McCrary,310 also
supports this conclusion. In Runyon, parents of two African American
students challenged a private school’s policy against admitting black
students.311 The Supreme Court resoundingly rejected the school’s freedom
of association,312 parental rights,313 and privacy314 defenses and held that the
admissions policy was a violation of the students’ constitutional rights.315
Runyon makes clear that imposing antidiscrimination requirements on
private schools is constitutional. Thus, the Court has shown a willingness to
curtail private schools’ discriminatory policies and block public funding of
discriminatory schools. Extending these holdings to prevent schools from
discriminating against LGBT students, or at least to prevent public dollars
from going to such schools, is a natural next step.
Furthermore, instituting protections for LGBT students would promote
important government interests. First, as evidenced in Runyon and Norwood,
eliminating discrimination is itself an important state interest.316 Second, the
government has a vested interest in instilling children with certain universal
values; in fact, this is one of the primary purposes of public education.317
Preventing sexual-orientation discrimination would communicate to children
the importance of empathy, respect, tolerance, equality, and diversity, which
at least one scholar argues are central to the purpose of publicly funded
education.318
B. How LGBT Students Could Obtain Protection
This section considers two potential options for providing LGBT students
with much-needed protection from discrimination. First, Title IX could be
molded to include protection against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. Second, a student-plaintiff could bring a federal constitutional
claim and argue for a relaxed approach to the state action doctrine, such that
a private school would be treated as a state actor and a student-plaintiff could
309. See, e.g., id. at 469 (“[D]iscriminatory treatment exerts a pervasive influence on the
entire educational process.”); see also id. at 463 (“That the Constitution may compel toleration
of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support
for such discrimination.”).
310. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
311. Id. at 163–64.
312. Id. at 175–76.
313. Id. at 176–77.
314. Id. at 178 (“The Court has repeatedly stressed that while parents have a constitutional
right to send their children to private schools and a constitutional right to select private schools
that offer specialized instruction, they have no constitutional right to provide their children
with private school education unfettered by reasonable government regulation.”).
315. Id. at 186.
316. See Kavey, supra note 48, at 766.
317. See Shiffrin, supra note 300, at 513.
318. Id.
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proceed with an equal protection claim. This Note ultimately argues that an
equal protection claim is the most viable option.
1. Mold Title IX to Cover Sexual Orientation
One potential way to protect LGBT students would be for Congress to alter
existing antidiscrimination legislation. Title IX would be a logical place to
locate protections for LGBT students, since it already outlaws discrimination
in education based on sex.319 If federal support for voucher programs were
to increase, participating schools would likely be subject to Title IX since
federal grant money is considered an applicable form of “federal financial
assistance” for the purposes of Title IX.320 Establishing LGBT protections
under Title IX could occur in one of two ways, both of which require two
steps: (1) amend § 1681(a)(1) within Title IX and judicially interpret “sex”
to include “sexual orientation,” as has been done in the employment
context,321 or (2) amend § 1681(a)(1) and also amend the body of Title IX to
explicitly, textually prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination.
To utilize Title IX to protect LGBT students in elementary schools and
high schools, § 1681(a)(1) would need to be amended. The provision
currently states: “in regard to admissions to educational institutions, this
section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education, professional
education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of
undergraduate higher education.”322 Primary and secondary schools are
notably absent from the list. The exclusion of primary and secondary schools
was intended to ensure that single-sex schools could continue to operate.323
Amending § 1681(a)(1) to protect LGBT students need not disturb that goal.
The amendment could provide for universal application of Title IX
regulations to primary and secondary schools, both public and private, with
a built-in exception stating that nothing in the legislation should be
319. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
320. The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether indirect federal aid could
trigger Title IX in Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In Grove, federal grant
money was disbursed to qualifying students, who then chose to spend their grant money at
Grove City College, a private institution—similar to the way in which voucher money is first
disbursed to parents, who then choose where to spend the money. Id. at 559–62. In a sex
discrimination suit, the Court found that the language of Title IX suggests no distinction
between indirect and direct funding and held that indirect aid does trigger Title IX, though
only for the specific program receiving aid. Id. at 564, 573.
321. See infra notes 325–32 and accompanying text.
322. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1).
323. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities
Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,530, 62,532 (Oct. 25, 2006) (“Title
IX has always permitted single-sex schools under conditions that ensure nondiscrimination.
Existing educational research suggests that single-sex education may provide benefits to some
students under certain circumstances.”); Elizabeth S. Kisthardt, Comment, Singling Them Out:
The Influence of the “Boy Crisis” on the New Title IX Regulations, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J.
313, 313 (2007) (highlighting that the original intent of Title IX was to allow for single-sex
education).
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interpreted to prohibit single-sex schools.324 If § 1681(a)(1) was amended to
cover primary and secondary schools, protection for LGBT students could be
pursued in two ways: judicial interpretation or another statutory amendment.
One resolution would be for courts to interpret Title IX’s ban on “sex
discrimination” to also prohibit sexual-orientation discrimination. Many
scholars argue that, by definition, the prohibition of “sex discrimination”
includes discrimination based on sexual orientation.325 Their logic is
founded in the concept of sex stereotyping, which the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.326 Simply put, the argument
is that the variable underlying sexual-orientation discrimination is sex:
discrimination against a gay man is premised on the fact that he is a man, and
men are stereotypically attracted to women. If the sex of the target individual
were changed, the perpetrator would have no reason to discriminate; a
woman attracted to men does not break a sex stereotype, and therefore would
not be the target of sexual-orientation discrimination. No court of appeals
has ruled on whether this logic is valid in the Title IX context, and district
courts have come down on both sides of the issue.327 However, the same
logic is being used successfully in Title VII cases. Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 regulates sex discrimination in employment,328 and Title
VII jurisprudence is regularly used to inform Title IX interpretation.329 Most
notably, the Seventh Circuit resoundingly approved the argument in Hively
v. Ivy Tech Community College of Indiana,330 as did the Second Circuit in
Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc.331 However, the predictive value of Hively
324. The exception could look something like 20 U.S.C. § 1686, which states:
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this chapter, nothing contained herein
shall be construed to prohibit any educational institution receiving funds under this Act, from
maintaining separate living facilities for the different sexes.”
325. See, e.g., Courtney Weiner, Note, Sex Education: Recognizing Anti-Gay Harassment
as Sex Discrimination Under Title VII and Title IX, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 193
(2005) (“[S]exual orientation discrimination is a form of sex/gender discrimination.”).
326. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that treating someone differently because he or she does
not comport with the stereotypes associated with his or her gender is a form of sex
discrimination under Title VII).
327. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Saginaw Pub. Schs., No. 12-10354, 2012 WL 2450805, at *8,
*11 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2012) (holding that “while discrimination based on noncompliance
with sexual stereotypes may be actionable under federal law, discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not”). But cf. Estate of Brown v. Ogletree, No. 11-cv-1491, 2012 WL 591190,
at *17 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2012) (“[H]arassment due to a victim’s perceived homosexuality is
sufficient to constitute ‘sexual harassment,’ regardless of whether the victim is in fact gay.”),
rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. Cypress Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 863
F. Supp. 2d 632 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
328. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . .
sex.”).
329. See, e.g., Adele P. Kimmel, Title IX: An Imperfect but Vital Tool to Stop Bullying of
LGBT Students, 125 YALE L.J. 2006, 2016 (2016) (“When interpreting Title IX’s prohibition
against sex discrimination in education, courts often rely on Title VII precedent on sex
discrimination in employment.”).
330. 853 F.3d 339 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (holding that sexual-orientation discrimination
is a form of sex discrimination and therefore prohibited under Title VII).
331. 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
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and Zarda is questionable, given that the only other court of appeals to rule
on the matter, the Eleventh Circuit, ruled the other way in Evans v. Georgia
Regional Hospital.332
Another resolution would be to simply amend Title IX to include an
explicit ban on discrimination based on sexual orientation. Given the current
political climate, such an amendment is unlikely.333 Besides, any resolution
attempted through Title IX faces several challenges. First, the text of Title
IX allows for religious exemptions.334 By applying for an exemption, private
elementary and high schools could participate in a voucher program and yet
avoid compliance with Title IX’s antidiscrimination norms.335 Second, even
without an official exemption, schools have a simple workaround that frees
them from the burden of Title IX: do not accept federal aid. In fact, many
colleges currently take this approach.336 Thus, although a Title IX approach
may provide some benefit to LGBT students, it would not entirely eliminate
discrimination against LGBT students in the private school admissions
process.
2. The Equal Protection Claim
The option that is most likely to successfully provide protections for an
LGBT student is to bring an equal protection claim. As discussed in Part
II.B, a court faced with a student-plaintiff’s equal protection challenge would
be unlikely to find that the voucher-receiving private school’s discrimination

332. 850 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that sexual-orientation discrimination is not
prohibited under Title VII), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 557 (2017). Additionally, the Trump
Department of Justice has signaled that it will not support the Seventh and Second Circuits’
interpretation of Title VII. See Joseph Goldstein, Discrimination Based on Sex Is Debated in
Case of Gay Sky Diver, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/
nyregion/discrimination-based-on-sex-sky-diver-donald-zarda.html [https://perma.cc/RNZ6NX6N] (noting that the Department of Justice filed a brief in Zarda, which stated that it
opposed finding sex discrimination to include sexual-orientation discrimination).
333. At the time of writing, Republicans had majorities in both houses of Congress and a
Republican president in the White House. See Russell Berman, The Republican Majority in
Congress Is an Illusion, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2017/03/the-republican-majority-in-congress-is-an-illusion/521403/
[https://perma.cc/4DEZ-AFEW]. For the same reason, passing new legislation outlawing
sexual-orientation discrimination (whether in education or across the board) is a highly
unrealistic option.
334. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(3) (2012) (“[T]his section shall not apply to an educational
institution which is controlled by a religious organization if the application of this subsection
would not be consistent with the religious tenets of such organization.”); 34 C.F.R. § 106.12
(2018).
335. See Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327,
327 n.1 (2016). As of September 2016, 245 colleges and universities had been granted Title
IX religious exemptions. See id.
336. See Ibby Caputo & Jon Marcus, The Controversial Reason Some Religious Colleges
Forgo Federal Funding, ATLANTIC (July 7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2016/07/the-controversial-reason-some-religious-colleges-forgo-federal-funding/
490253/ [https://perma.cc/KYT2-5NAT].
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qualifies as state action.337 Thus, a student-plaintiff would need to argue for
a relaxed approach to the state action doctrine.
a. Arguing for Relaxed State Action
As a general matter, courts have historically been reluctant to find that the
action of a private actor is state action.338 However, in at least one context,
the Supreme Court arguably relaxed the state action doctrine in order to make
headway regarding particularly invidious discrimination:
race
discrimination.339 Scholars have observed that the Court has been more
likely to find state action in claims of race discrimination.340 This trend is
evidenced by the Court’s track record:
[T]he Court found state action in all of the leading cases from 1940 to 1969,
[and] all but four of [the fourteen] cases contained a race discrimination
claim. In contrast, nearly three-quarters of the state action cases in the
1970s and 1980s did not involve race, and the Court found state action in
only one of them (Lugar) and by only a one-vote margin. Additionally, of
the four major state action cases involving race from 1970 to 1989, the
Court ruled in favor of the state action claim in three.341

In addition, at least one court of appeals has explicitly held that the type of
discrimination at issue should affect whether a court finds state action.342
Sexual-orientation discrimination in voucher programs merits a relaxed
state-action approach for three reasons. First, sexual orientation shares some
of the categorical traits that justify heightened scrutiny of racial
classifications. Second, in many voucher programs, private schools have
become agents of the state. Finally, Brentwood’s flexible approach
constitutes a doctrinal shift and supports finding state action even outside the
strictures of traditional approaches.
i. Sexual Orientation Shares Traits with Race
The Court has identified a number of traits that warrant heightened
scrutiny in an equal protection analysis.343 These same traits justify relaxing
the state action doctrine to protect vulnerable groups. Three of the primary
traits that courts have considered are: immutability, political powerlessness,
and history of discrimination.344 Claims based on race have received a
337. See supra Part II.B.2.
338. See Hulden, supra note 236, at 1258–61.
339. See id. at 1259 (“The Court has been more likely to find state action . . . where the
constitutional violation is discrimination based on race.”).
340. See, e.g., id.
341. Peretti, supra note 226, at 300–01. Race discrimination state action claims decreased
dramatically after 1970, largely as a result of legislative efforts to combat discrimination. Id.
at 274–75.
342. Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 12 F.3d 388, 392 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[A] less
stringent standard for finding state action should be applied when racial or sexual
discrimination is at issue . . . .”), rev’d on other grounds, 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
343. See Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 22–23.
344. See id.
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relaxed state-action approach on the basis of these traits, which also apply to
LGBT people.345
First, sexual orientation is immutable. In this context, immutability refers
to whether an individual can change the characteristic in question. For
example, race is considered immutable because an individual will always be
the same race as he or she was at birth. Logically, an immutable
characteristic merits special protection from discrimination because an
individual has no control over whether he or she is born with the trait.
Opponents of gay rights claim that sexual orientation is not out of an
individual’s control and argue that sexual orientation is a behavioral
“choice.”346 Although sexual orientation may be considered more dynamic
than race, it is nonetheless an inherent personal characteristic that an
individual cannot choose. Nuances aside, the immutability of sexual
orientation for the purposes of the law was heartily affirmed in Obergefell v.
The Obergefell opinion repeatedly acknowledges the
Hodges.347
immutability of sexual orientation, both explicitly, by referring to the amicus
curiae brief of the American Psychological Association that stated as
much,348 and implicitly, through numerous comparisons to the bans on
interracial marriage that were struck down in Loving v. Virginia.349
Second, sexual-orientation minorities are significantly lacking in political
power. As with immutability, not everyone agrees that LGBT people lack
political power. Critics, such as the late Justice Antonin Scalia,350 like to
portray LGBT people as “a sinister elite, pulling marionette strings behind
the scenes of Hollywood and Washington, hell-bent on the destruction of
good and normal society.”351 Given that politicians have not deigned to
legislatively protect LGBT people in basically any context or at any level,352
this characterization is obviously wrong. As scholars have explained, “The
345. Note that this analysis is not intended to inappropriately equate the experiences of
racial minorities and sexual-orientation minorities. Michael Kavey aptly explains that
“[w]hile nobody denies that African Americans have endured especially horrific forms of
discrimination throughout history, other groups have also experienced and continue to
experience the injustice of discriminatory laws and social practices.” Kavey, supra note 48, at
773.
346. See Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 30 (noting that “the immutability of sexual
orientation has been the subject of significant social, religious, and legal debate”).
347. See supra notes 209–21 and accompanying text.
348. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596 (2015).
349. Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 29–31; see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2598. See
generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
350. In Romer v. Evans, Justice Scalia called the discriminatory amendment simply an
“effort by the majority of citizens to preserve its view of sexual morality statewide, against
the efforts of a geographically concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine
it.” 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He reiterated this sentiment in his dissent
in Lawrence v. Texas, where he called the majority opinion “the product of a Court, which is
the product of a law-profession culture, that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual
agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists directed at
eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct.” 539
U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
351. Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 38.
352. See supra Part II.
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legislative and judicial victories achieved by gay people, largely aimed at
dismantling oppressive and focused discrimination, do not represent ‘spoils
of war won by a politically powerful class. Instead, they are merely kernels
of dignity accomplished by decades of political struggle.’”353
Finally, it is undeniable that LGBT people have been subjected to centuries
of discrimination and moral and legal condemnation.354 In its pre-Obergefell
decision overturning same-sex marriage bans, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals declared that “homosexuals are among the most stigmatized,
misunderstood, and discriminated-against minorities in the history of the
world.”355 For decades, homosexuality was treated as a mental illness, and
“[i]ndividuals with same-sex attraction were in fact routinely prescribed
shock therapy, punishing methods of aversion therapy, and lobotomies as
medical and psychological treatments designed to supposedly cure them of
same-sex attraction.”356 There is a vast and vivid history of discrimination
against LGBT people. Therefore, LGBT people should be granted
heightened protection.
ii. Voucher Schools Are Acting as Agents of the State
One of the core components of a judicial search for state action is
identifying scenarios in which a private actor can be said to be acting in the
government’s stead. This is by definition what occurs in a voucher program
because the private school has essentially become an agent of the state. The
state has said: “We have tried to provide adequate public education, but we
have failed. We are asking some other actors to step in and do our job for
us.” Of course, critics would counter that this is just an example of delegation
of a public function that the Court has acknowledged is not exclusive to the
state and therefore not sufficient for a finding of state action. However, the
delegation at issue in voucher programs is unique in that it is typically a result
of the state’s failure to carry out a mandatory duty. Although education is
not a federally guaranteed fundamental right,357 every state has
constitutionally adopted an affirmative duty to provide its citizens with an
education.358 When states institute voucher programs in acknowledgment of
the fact that the public schools are failing to provide an adequate education,
they are shifting a constitutional burden to private actors. This unique quality

353. Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 37 (quoting Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Not Without
Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class Doctrine, 65
ALA. L. REV. 975, 1032 (2014)).
354. See id. at 23 (“Throughout history, homosexuals have been regarded by law and by
society as criminals, sexual predators, pedophiles, unfit parents, deserving targets of violent
hate crimes, disposable and compromised employees, crazies, pariahs, and the living
embodiment of all that is bad.”).
355. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014).
356. Bernhardt, supra note 216, at 24.
357. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1973).
358. EMILY PARKER, EDUC. COMM’N OF THE STATES., 50-STATE REVIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION 1 (2016), http://www.ecs.org/ec-content/uploads/
2016-Constitutional-obligations-for-public-education-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/N62R-MZLD].
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of voucher programs justifies breaking with the requirement of exclusivity in
a traditional public-function approach.
iii. Brentwood Signaled a Doctrinal Shift Toward Increased Flexibility
in State Action Analyses
Finally, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Ass’n’s entwinement approach constituted a doctrinal shift toward a flexible,
fact-based analysis of state action and signaled that the Court may be more
inclined to find state action in nontraditional scenarios.359 For years, the
Court grappled with an unwieldy set of case law in an attempt to distill clear
rules for finding state action, without much success. In Brentwood, Justice
Souter seems to avoid that mess altogether and focuses on considering the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether state action exists.360 In
the case of a student-plaintiff, although any single factor might not
individually be sufficient under traditional approaches to the state action
doctrine, Brentwood cracks open the door to weighing all those factors
together. The various factors in a student-plaintiff’s case—the unique nature
of the school environment, the strong government interest in eradicating
discrimination in education, public funding, and state regulatory oversight—
combine to create a weighty case for a finding of state action.
b. Responding to Likely Challenges from Schools
Private schools will likely fight back against student-plaintiffs’ attempts to
curtail the schools’ ability to discriminate. The rights of LGBT people is one
of the most contentious topics in the ongoing culture war between religious
conservatives and liberal civil rights activists.361 A discussion of how to
protect LGBT students requires briefly contemplating how opposing parties
might attempt to defeat those protections. This section considers two First
Amendment defenses a private school is likely to raise when faced with a
claim of discrimination from an LGBT student-plaintiff: free exercise and
freedom of association.362
The First Amendment promises that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”363 A private school is likely to claim that being forced to accept
359. See supra notes 266–76 and accompanying text (discussing Brentwood).
360. See Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 298
(2001); supra notes 272–75.
361. See Makofsky, supra note 6, at 982 (“There is a tension between the expanding
definition of equality on the basis of . . . sexual orientation under constitutional and statutory
law on one hand and a religious institution’s First Amendment rights that include the right to
free exercise and the right to freedom of association on the other hand.”).
362. This section assumes that the private school at issue is affiliated with a religion that
has anti-LGBT tenets.
363. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Because the Bill of Rights as originally written only applies to
the federal government, the Supreme Court has incorporated many of the elements of the Bill
of Rights as protecting against infringement by state governments as well, including the
guarantee against the establishment of religion. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15
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LGBT students burdens its to freely exercise religion. This claim will likely
fail for two reasons. First, requiring schools to admit LGBT students does
not mean that the schools are required to support LGBT rights. The right of
an LGBT student to attend an anti-LGBT school can coexist with the school’s
right to espouse anti-LGBT views.364 Second, Supreme Court precedent
militates in favor of a student-plaintiff. The Court has explicitly recognized
that the government’s heightened interests in the area of education renders
regulation of religious schools less constitutionally problematic than
interference with churches.365 Additionally, the Court’s decision in
Employment Division v. Smith366 suggests that antidiscrimination laws do
not, as a general rule, violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause as
long as they are neutral laws of general applicability.367 The Court has
granted religious organizations a “ministerial exception” to employment
discrimination laws, allowing them to hire and fire religious leaders without
government oversight.368 However, such an exception applies only to
employees whose job it is to teach the faith or otherwise preach the religious
mission of the organization and therefore would not apply to student
admissions.369 These two factors suggest that a school’s free exercise
challenge will likely fail.
The freedom to associate stems from the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment.370 The expressive value of association has been used as a
foundation for organizations that wish to deny membership to certain groups
of people.371 There is some uncertainty in Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding the interplay of discrimination and freedom of association. The
Court noted in Norwood v. Harrison that “[i]nvidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded affirmative
constitutional protections,” which seems to suggest that a freedom-ofassociation defense would not defeat a discrimination claim.372 However,
approximately twenty-five years after Norwood, such a defense did prevail
(1947) (noting that “[n]either a state nor the Federal Government” may prefer one religion
over another).
364. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (“[I]t may be assumed that parents
have a First Amendment right to send their children to educational institutions that promote
the belief that racial segregation is desirable, and that the children have an equal right to attend
such institutions. But it does not follow that the practice of excluding racial minorities from
such institutions is also protected by the same principle.”).
365. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 n.29 (1983); Makofsky, supra
note 6, at 983.
366. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
367. Makofsky, supra note 6, at 983–84; see also Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879
(1990) (holding that because a ban on peyote use was not targeted at banning religious
practices, but rather was neutral and universally applicable, the right of free exercise did not
excuse religious peyote users from complying with the ban).
368. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188–89
(2012); Makofksy, supra note 6, at 984.
369. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89; Makofksy, supra note 6, at 984.
370. Makofsky, supra note 6, at 985.
371. Id.
372. 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973).
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in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.373 In Dale, an openly gay scoutmaster
challenged his expulsion from the group under a New Jersey
antidiscrimination law.374 The Supreme Court found that the Boy Scouts’s
membership decisions were a form of expressive association and therefore
protected by the First Amendment.375 A private school would likely argue
that Dale should apply to the school’s admissions policy and that being
forced to accept LGBT students would violate the school’s freedom of
association. However, this argument is likely to fail given the unique nature
of the educational environment:
The Dale Court . . . did not reject the possibility that sufficiently
compelling state interests could override free speech associational rights in
some contexts. On the contrary, the Court reaffirmed the longstanding
principle that the right of expressive association “is not absolute” and can
be overridden by regulations that are narrowly tailored “to serve compelling
state interests.”376

The government has a significant interest in eliminating discrimination in
education.377 This interest may be strong enough to outweigh the minimal
burden that antidiscrimination requirements would impose on private
schools’ expressive association rights.378
CONCLUSION
The United States has made much progress toward assuring that, as
promised in the Fourteenth Amendment, all citizens receive the dignity of
equal protection of the laws. There is still, however, a long way to go to fully
achieving that laudable goal. Along with many other minority groups, LGBT
people are still discriminated against in many facets of everyday life. Given
the unique importance of the educational context and the involvement of
public tax dollars, discrimination against LGBT students in voucher
programs is especially heinous.
LGBT students have virtually no legal recourse if they are rejected by a
discriminatory private school. Neither state nor federal law provides
sufficient protection. Whether via judicial interpretation or federal
legislation, something must be done to end the state-sponsored
discrimination that occurs when voucher-accepting private schools are
allowed to expel or reject vulnerable LGBT youth. Action is needed to
ensure equality.

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.

530 U.S. 640 (2000).
Id. at 644.
Id. at 661.
Kavey, supra note 48, at 765 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 648).
See supra notes 316–18 and accompanying text.
See Kavey, supra note 48, at 765–69.

